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Summary 
Time Trade-Off valuations of health are widely used in economic evaluation of health 
care. Current approaches to eliciting TTO values, and their use in economic evaluation, 
rests on specific assumptions about the way utility relates to time and health. Both the 
assumptions themselves and evidence of violations of them are discussed in the 
literature - yet the issues appear not to be widely appreciated by those using and 
applying TTO. This paper adds to that literature by demonstrating both the requirements 
of TTO and violations of these assumptions in terms of the underlying indifference 
curve maps and utility functions. The advantage of this approach is that is demonstrates 
very clearly a number of fundamental problems for the way TTO values are currently 
elicited and used in Cost Utility Analysis. In essence, it is extremely unwise to assume 
that the current ‘tariffs’ of TTO values, such as those routinely used by NICE and other 
organisations, can be applied irrespective of the duration of the health states to which 
they are assigned. The estimates of QALYs that result will, quite often, simply be 
wrong. We suggest a number of solutions, including the provision of multiple value 
sets, for a range of durations.   
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Economic evaluation of health care is commonly undertaken by estimating the 
incremental cost per quality adjusted life year (QALY) gained. QALYs are estimated by 
multiplying length of life in a given state with the value placed on that state, on a scale 
from 1 (full health) to 0 (dead), with health states worse than dead represented by 
negative values. A widely used method for eliciting these values is the Time Trade Off 
TTO). First proposed by Torrance and Zapursky (1972), TTO values are sought by 
asking participants to consider living for some fixed period of time t in the state to be 
valued, in comparison with some shorter period of time x in full health. The latter is 
varied until the participant is indifferent between the two options, at which point the 
value for the state is yielded by (x/t). While variations on this procedure exist (for 
example, for temporary rather than chronic states, and for states worse rather than better 
than dead) this remains the basic approach (Drummond et al 2005). 
 
The TTO is, together with other, less widely used alternatives to the valuation of health 
states – the Standard Gamble (SG), Visual Analogue Scale (VAS) and Discrete Choice 
Experiments (DCE) – a stated preference procedure. In each case, preferences are 
obtained by statements and responses made by individuals presented with hypothetical 
scenarios, rather than obtained from budget- (or other resource-) constrained choices 
they have been observed to make in ‘real life’. TTO was developed initially as a more 
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pragmatic way of eliciting valuations that approximate SG utilities, but has since 
become a valuation method of interest in its own right. Mehrez and Gafni (1990) note 
that, despite its widespread use, the TTO “has not been related in a general way to any 
existing behavioural theory”. More generally, Arnesen and Norheim (2003) note their 
opinion that, in the field of health state valuation research, there is 
 
“…a disproportion between the abundance of empirical and technical 
papers and a lack of a more conceptual debate….Discussions within the 
same paradigmatic framework tend to turn around technical solutions, 
rather than questioning the underlying assumptions.” 
 
There have been some attempts to place the TTO in the context of economic 
theory. For example, Mehrez and Gafni (1990) represent TTO valuations of 
health-related quality of life using indifference curves occupying utility space in 
health and length of life. Buckingham and Devlin (2006) also use indifference 
curves to demonstrate the TTO, and use these to represent the TTO (as 
conventionally used) as a Hicksian ‘compensating variation’ for a gain 
(improvement in health). 
 
However, neither of these papers considers in any detail the nature of the 
indifference curve maps for health and length of life, or the utility functions 
underpinning them, and how these might relate to particular requirements of 
these assumed in the application of TTO values in economic evaluation  
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This paper considers the shape and characteristics of the indifference curves in health 
and time that are suggested by generally accepted beliefs and empirical evidence about 
preferences regarding health and length of life. Specifically, we show what the 
indifference curves for health and time would be like if the basic requirements of TTO 
valuations were to hold. We then consider the indifference curves suggested by a 
number of circumstances where these requirements will not hold, including - in the 
simplest case - the possibility of diminishing marginal utility in states of poor health and 
(more fundamentally) the existence of maximum endurable time (MET) (Sutherland et 
al., 1982; Dolan and Stalmeier, 2003; Tsuchiya and Dolan, 2005) and states worse than 
being dead (SWD) (Patrick et al., 1994; Macran and Kind P, 2001; Robinson and 
Spencer  2006). 
 
In doing so, we demonstrate fundamental and non-trivial problems with the way TTO 
values are currently used to estimate QALYs that we think merit wider debate among 
health economists. We contend that the use of a single ‘tariff’ of TTO values for health 
states, such as that used by NICE (NICE 2004) and other similar decision-making 
bodies internationally, will yield estimates of QALYs that are, in many cases, quite 
simply wrong.  
 
Constant proportionality and the requirements for “well behaved” numeraires and 
valuands 
The key assumption required for the current TTO approach to yield value tariffs that, 
for any given state, may be applied for any duration is constant proportionality 
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(Bleichrodt and Johansson 1996; Dolan and Stalmeier 2003). As described in the 
previous section, a TTO value is given by the ratio (x/t), achieved as the point of 
indifference between t in the health state of interest and x (< t) in full health. Constant 
proportionality requires that participants indicate that they are prepared to give up the 
same proportion of time (eg. 20%) in perfect health (x), regardless of the length of time 
in poor health (t) being considered. So, for example, if a person is indifferent between a 
given state for t = 10 years and x = 6 years in perfect health, for the resulting TTO value 
(0.6) to be invariant to duration would require that the same state considered for t = 20 
would yield x = 12; and t = 5 with x = 3 and so on – a sacrifice of 40% of t in each case.  
 
Constant proportionality arises from a relationship between two utility functions – the 
utility of additional years in perfect health, and the utility of additional years in the (less 
than perfect) health state of interest. Under conditions where the marginal utility 
functions of each have similar characteristics, constant proportionality will result. For 
example, if the marginal utility of additional years in full health and the marginal utility 
of additional years in some other health state of interest are both constant, constant 
proportionality will result. That is, the same TTO value for that state will be produced 
regardless of whether the ‘reference point’ duration t is 10 years (as it was in the TTO 
value set currently used by NICE in the UK – see Dolan 1997) or 10 weeks. However, 
constant proportionality in itself does not require that the marginal utility of time in a 
given (less than perfect) health state is constant. Constant proportionality might arise 
where non-linearities in the utility of time, in the less than perfect health being valued, 
are exactly matched by non-linearities of time in perfect health. Evidence of violations 
of constant proportionality suggests this is not the case.  
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Suppose that each year in perfect health is valued at exactly 1 util - that is, each 
additional year in perfect health confers a constant addition to total utility 1. If this were 
the case, time in perfect health might provide a ‘well behaved’ measure of value or 
‘numeraire’. (Recall that the TTO values a specified state of health for a specified 
period of time as a number of years in perfect health which is equivalent in utility 
terms). 
 
The thing being valued (the valuand) is time spent in poor health. In this instance, a 
well behaved valuand would also be one in which utility was proportional to the time 
spent in the relevant state. The nature of this relationship would not be of concern 
providing that we are only attempting to value a specific combination of length of life 
and health state - for example, if our aim were to value 10 years in a particular state of 
poor health. If we determine that the utility of 10 years in poor health is equivalent to 5 
years in perfect health, we would value that state at 5 utils. However, the relationship 
between utility and time in poor health does become material if we attempt to determine 
the average flow of utility through time, as we do when we construct an index or ‘tariff’ 
of values such as those commonly used in CUA. In the example above, we observe that 
the 5 utils are experienced over the 10 years of poor health, so the average flow of 
utility is 0.5 utils per year, or simply, as in the sort of value sets that are published and 
widely used in CUA, a value of 0.5 for the health state of interest.  
 
                                            
1 We use the term ‘util’ to focus the readers’ attention on the underlying concepts of utility and consumer 
choice. However, since one year of full health = 1 QALY, it may help readers to instead think of these 
utils as QALY estimates.   
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This can create a serious problem if we were to apply the average flow of utility, 
elicited from some specified time period, to value the experience of living in that state 
of health for a different period of time; as we subsequently show. 
 
An example of a utility map with a well behaved numeraire and well behaved valuands 
is illustrated by Figure 1 which can be interpreted as follows. The indifference curves 
(which can be thought of as analogous to the contour lines on a map) indicate specific 
levels of utility. To continue the analogy, closely packed indifference curves indicate 
where the utility increases most rapidly. Increasing utility can result from increasing 
levels of health. Under ‘normal circumstances’ we might also expect utility to increase 
with length of life (as when we gain extra pleasure by living longer), however, we see 
below that this need not necessarily be the case. The corresponding length of life to 
utility functions (derived from the same mathematical model2) are shown in Figure 2 
and the corresponding marginal utility schedules in Figure 3. Figure 1 suggests that 
utility is always increasing in both health and in length of life.  
 
FIGURES 1, 2 AND 3 ABOUT HERE 
 
In the hypothetical examples used here, time (T) is scaled from 0 years to 10 years. 
Health (H) is scaled from 0 to 1000. This latter scaling is chosen to avoid potential 
confusion with the utility index (more properly, the average utility flow) associated with 
states of health. The interpretation of ‘health’ is best thought of as some physical 
                                            
2 The mathematical model used to produce Figures 1 to 3 is U = H/1000*T/10. 
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measure or description of ‘healthiness’. If it helps, the reader is encouraged to imagine 
this measure of health to be something like the maximum distance a person can walk 
before their pulse rate reaches some specified value. 
 
Sources of non-proportionality and non-monotonicity in the relationship between time 
and utility 
 
First we consider diminishing marginal utility in time. This is plausible a priori, 
particularly for states of health that are less than perfect3. As length of life is increased, 
the addition to utility from later years in a poor health state may be less than the 
addition to utility from earlier years in that state4. The possibility of diminishing 
marginal utility of health in time is illustrated for the intermediate state of health 
labelled ‘H = 500’ in Figures 4 and 55.  
 
FIGURES 4, 5 AND 6 ABOUT HERE 
 
                                            
3 A related issue, which we do not discuss here, is whether there is also a satiation point for perfect health. 
If we were guaranteed to remain in perfect health, would be wish to live forever?  
4 Note that marginal utility, in the context of stated preferences, is determined by ‘affective forecasts’ 
made by members of the general public being asked to contemplate a given health state now and in the 
future, as opposed to the marginal utility experienced by those who live in that state year on year. The 
literature on experienced utility suggests that patients with chronic conditions tend to assign higher values 
to their health than members of the general public – a finding generally attributed to adaptation (Brazier et 
al 2005). The effect of adaptation works in the opposite direction to diminishing marginal utility. We do 
not address experienced utility in this paper, although our conceptual framework could readily be adapted 
to accommodate it.  
5 Figures 4, 5 and 6 are produced using the expression U =H/1000*T/10-0.4*((1-H/1000)*(T/10)^2) 
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Now consider the possibility of MET. The intuition is appealing: namely, that there 
exist states of health so severe that people would only willingly endure them for a 
limited time (for example, to allow them to ‘put their affairs in order’). One might 
speculate that the MET would be longer for states of health that are less bad, and shorter 
for states of health that are more so. 
 
The health state labelled ‘H = 250’ provides an example of MET. We observe that, in 
the example shown in Figure 4, the total utility of years of life in that state increases up 
to approximately 4 years, after which further increases in length of life in that state lead 
to lower utility. In other words, the marginal utility of time after approximately 4 years 
becomes negative as shown in Figure 5. Further, in this example if the length of life 
experienced in this state exceeds 8 years, total utility becomes negative6.  
 
Now consider states worse than dead7. The health state labelled as ‘H = 0’ in Figure 4 
provides an example of a state worse than dead for all lengths of life. We see that the 
utility associated with living in such a state is negative over the entire domain of 
longevity. 
 
                                            
6 There are two levels of time which may have some bearing on MET: the t at which MU becomes 
negative (and TU starts to decline), and the t at which TU becomes negative. We proceed on the basis that 
it is the latter which is relevant to identifying MET, on the grounds that so long as TU remains positive, 
surviving will remain attractive.  
7 A weakness of this empirical literature is that states are considered to be either always better than, or 
always worse than, dead – irrespective of the time those states are experienced. Further,, the TTO 
methods used to value states worse than dead in TTO often rely on quite different elicitation procedures 
than states better than dead at any given duration (Drummond et al 2005). Aggregating values < 0 and > 0 
in the construction of value tariffs therefore has questionable validity; this issue potentially affects the 
values for all states - and the reliability of estimates of changes in utility resulting from an improvements 
in health. 
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Implications for the utility map 
 
We now consider the implications for the indifference mapping (Figure 6) suggested by 
non-proportionality and non-monotonicity in the relationship between time and utility. 
Let utility be a function of time (T) and health (H): 
 
U = U(T, H)          [1] 
 
We will assume that utility is always a positive function of health (δU/ δH > 0), so that 
we always prefer more health to less health for any life expectancy. However, given 
diminishing returns and MET, the marginal utility of T may be either >, equal to, or < 0.  
 
The change in utility arising from any change in the amount of H and T available is 
given by:  
 
dU = dT * δU/ δT  +  dH * δU/ δH      [2] 
 
As one moves along an indifference curve, the increase in utility resulting from a given 
increase in H must be exactly offset by a corresponding reduction in utility arising from 
the reduction in T since, by definition, utility is identical at every point along the 
indifference curve. Because utility is equal at all points along the indifference curve, 
dU = 0, hence  
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dH/dT = - δU/ δT * δH/ δU       [3] 
 
Three results follow: 
i. The marginal rate of substitution (MRSH,T) of health for time (dH/ dT) is always 
of opposite sign to the marginal utility of time, δU/ δT. 
ii. (dH/ dT) equals zero when δU/δT = 0. 
iii. As the marginal utility of time (δU/ δT) assumes larger negative values, so the 
gradient of the indifference curves (dH/ dT) assumes larger positive values and 
vice versa.  
 
We can now infer the shape of the indifference curves in Figure 6 from the relationships 
portrayed in Figures 4 and 5.  
 
For the intermediate state of health H = 500, Figure 5 shows that marginal utility with 
respect to time to be universally positive but falling. Correspondingly, in Figure 6, as 
we move horizontally across at H = 500, we see that the indifference curves are 
downward sloping (in accordance with result i), but with reducing slope (in accordance 
with result iii). 
 
For health state H = 250 we see the effect of MET on the utility map. Moving across 
Figure 6 at H = 250, we begin with positive marginal utility of time (as shown in 
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Figure 5) and corresponding downward sloping indifference curves ((MRSH,T is 
negative, in accordance with result i). We see in Figure 5 that the marginal utility of 
time = 0 at approximately T = 4. This corresponds to the MET. In Figure 6 we see that 
the indifference curves are horizontal (δU/ δT = 0 in accordance with result ii). For H = 
250 and T > 4 (approximately) the marginal utility of time is seen in Figure 5 to be 
negative and increasingly so with increases in time. Correspondingly, we see in Figure 6 
that the indifference curves slope upwards (MRSH,T is positive, in accordance with 
result i), and that the slope increases as time increases (in accordance with result iii). 
 
Observe that in Figure 6 the minima on the indifference curves shift to the right as 
health increases, representing a plausible situation in which MET becomes longer as 
health states improve.  
 
For health state H = 0, Figure 5 shows that the marginal utility with respect to time is 
universally negative and decreasing with increasing time. This corresponds to the 
situation in Figure 6, where indifference curves are always upward sloping (MRSH,T is 
positive in accordance with result i) and increasingly so (in accordance with result iii). 
 
We have shown, in terms of rudimentary consumer choice theory, the characteristics of 
the utility function underlying the TTO which would be compatible with observed non-
proportionalities in the utility:time relation. An advantage of this approach is that it 
allows non-proportionalities, including MET, and states worse than dead, to be defined 
in the precise language of utility theory. 
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However, more importantly, speculating on the characteristics of the utility map reveals 
some quite fundamental problems with the way health state value sets are currently used 
to calculate QALYs.  
 
The implication for QALYs 
 
With non proportionalities generally, but particularly in the case of poor states of health, 
where MET is more likely, it would be highly inadvisable to use average utility flows 
(indices or ‘tariffs’) to estimate QALYs for periods other than the period used in their 
construction. Consider the case of H = 250 in Figure 6. To begin, observe that we could 
not apply a conventional TTO with a 10 year time horizon. To value 10 years in that 
state of health as so many years in perfect health we need to say how many years in 
perfect health, the 10 years in health state 250 are equivalent to. Observe that the 
indifference curve passing through point health state 250 and length of life 10 years 
does not correspond with any length of life in perfect health.  
 
Considering Figure 6 again, it would be feasible to value health over a 7 year time 
horizon. Seven years in H = 250 is approximately of equal utility (is on the same 
indifference curve) as 6 months in perfect health. Unfortunately we would have derived 
approximately the same equivalent time in perfect health if we had asked respondents to 
value H = 250 using a 1 year time horizon. Converting the results into average utility 
flows, the mean utility flow over the 7 year time horizon = 0.5/7.0 (approximately 0.07 
15 
utils per year). The mean utility flow over a 1 year time horizon is 0.5/1.0 (0.5 utils per 
year). Neither of these results is wrong. They differ simply because they apply to 
different periods of time.  
 
The consequence of applying an index derived from one time horizon to produce 
QALYs for a different time horizon is clearly illustrated in the example. If we estimated 
the utility of spending 1 year in the health state using the index derived from 7 years 
spent in that state, we would estimate the utility as 0.07 utils (or QALYs) instead of the 
0.5 utils (or QALYs) we ‘know’ it to be.  
 
Conversely if we had used the utility established from a 1 year time horizon to estimate 
the utility of 7 years in that state of health, we would have estimated it to be 3.5 utils 
(QALYs) rather than the 0.5 utils (QALYs) we ‘know’ it to be. 
 
Accordingly, it makes little sense to advocate particular durations when estimating 
average utility flows (indices or ‘tariffs’) if the aim is to avoid problems that arise from 
MET. 
 
A theoretically acceptable solution to the problems that effectively arise from the use of 
average utility flows would be to sum the marginal utility of time spent in various health 
states. This suggests that, in turn, the availability of multiple tariffs of health state 
values, corresponding to a range of alternative durations. In economic modelling, very 
severe states lasting for short periods – for example, resulting from treatment side 
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effects or acute exacerbations – could then be valued using a correspondingly short-
duration tariff, rather than the value corresponding to that state lasting for 10 years, as at 
present (NICE 2004).  
 
There are a number of challenges associated with such an approach. Pragmatically, the 
production of multiple tariffs requires more research effort both to elicit and model 
value sets for various durations. More evidence is required to understand how many 
tariffs are required and for what durations. More fundamentally, understanding how the 
marginal utility of time in one state may be related to the duration and utility of a 
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